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This is the sixth in a seven-part series based on a paper the author submitted for a Masters of Religion (MRel) programme in Middle East and North Africa Studies with the Arab Baptist Theological Seminary in Beirut entitled “Analysis of and Applications from the Writings of Tertullian about Persecution for Today.” 

Robert Louis Wilken, recently deceased Professor Emeritus of the History of Christianity at the University of Virginia, states that “Tertullian is the first in the history of Western civilisation to use the phrase ‘freedom of religion.’”[1] In his book, Liberty in the Things of God, Wilken argues that “in highlighting the freedom and dignity of human beings, [Tertullian] broke new ground.”[2]

Tertullian presents a simple and, at times, sardonic case for religious pluralism. He articulates a set of ideas which on the one hand will appear very familiar and instinctive to those influenced by classically liberal attitudes, and yet on the other remain rejected or contested by today’s equivalents to Scapula Tertullus, along with many Christians throughout the world who perceive the argument as an idolator’s charter.[3]  In the Apology, Tertullian declares,

Let one man worship God, another Jupiter; let one lift suppliant hands to the heavens, another to the alter of Fides; let one—if you choose to take this view of it—count in prayer the clouds, and another the ceiling panels; let one consecrate his own life to his God, and another that of a goat. For see that you do not give away further ground for the charge of irreligion, by taking away religious liberty, and forbidding free choice of deity, so that I may no longer worship according to my inclination, but am compelled to worship against it.[4]

In his address to Scapula, Tertullian again argues for freedom of conscience and against compulsion in religion, stating that it is everyone’s right to “worship as he thinketh best.” He argues that it is not “the business of religion to compel religion, which ought to be taken up willingly.” He points out the illogical pointlessness of compelling people to make sacrifices, noting, “should ye indeed compel us to sacrifice, that would do nought for your gods; of the unwilling they would not have sacrifice, unless they were wayward.”[5]

There are two aspects to Tertullian’s reasoning. First, it is not a matter for the state to compel religious belief. People should be free to believe in accordance with their conscience, regardless of how absurd the beliefs might be, and assuming they do not cause harm to others. Second, it is not a matter for the state to compel religious observance. Indeed, Tertullian points to the link between belief and observance in the practice of offering sacrifice. The refusal of Christians to make sacrifices to Roman gods and for the emperor was one of the critical points of tension and motivators for their persecution. The argument that Tertullian makes is that the Roman gods, if they did exist, would not be interested in worship and sacrifices made under obligation. It cannot be asserted that such a perspective has been consistently adopted by the Church throughout its history.

Some might regard such an appeal to peaceful pluralism as too liberal and relativistic. I would suggest that such an argument would mischaracterise Tertullian’s perspective and fails to note the expansive critique he offers of Roman beliefs and practices. In his complaints against the persecution of Christians, Tertullian makes full-throated and valorous defences of Christian beliefs and conduct. In presenting the case for tolerance of Christians, one might expect that he would avoid further antagonism of their enemies. However, Tertullian does not seek to curry favour with the persecutors. Indeed, he sets out scathing and often derisive critiques of the religious beliefs and practices of the Romans and all who indulge in idolatry. By way of summarising his objection, we can refer to his terse statement, “We do not worship your gods, because we know there are no such beings.”[6]

His willingness to pass judgement on non-Christian beliefs and practices is reinforced in his treatise, De Idololatria (On Idolatry), written between 197 and 211 to a Christian audience. He makes clear that idolatry isn’t limited to the veneration of idols and images, but rather it encompasses the breadth of pagan practices. Indeed, his definition is so broad as to make idolatry the main sin, encompassing all other sins. Tertullian calls on his fellow believers to be distinctive from their pagan neighbours. He answers an array of excuses for compromise with correction and rebuke.[7]

These examples of Tertullian’s uncompromising posture towards Pagans, their beliefs, rituals and lifestyles should provide a robust response to any who consider his position on religious freedom to be an indication of some sort of universalism or relativism. There exists the opposite perspective about Tertullian’s position on religious freedom, namely that it is hypocritical to cry out for the benefits of such freedom given the fervour of the contempt he expresses for non-Christian beliefs and practices. Guy G. Stroumsa, in his chapter entitled “Tertullian on idolatry and the limits of tolerance” in the book Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity, uses Tertullian’s treatise on idolatry in an attempt to problematise Tertullian’s argument for religious freedom in the Apology. I would argue that Stroumsa makes a compelling argument when he states, “as long as the Christians were in need of religious toleration for themselves, they knew how to make a case for its necessity.

As soon as they came to power, however, they forgot their early virtues and learned how to deprive others of what they had just acquired. Christian intolerance, in such a view of things, would be rooted in human nature, rather than in some implicit aspects of Christian theology.”[8] However, Tertullian was not writing from a position of power. As a result, Stroumsa confounds his argument and exposes a fallacy in his assertion that, “In the second and third centuries, Christian intellectuals were arguing for toleration, and yet they were unwilling (or unable) to accept the basic premise of religious toleration: a certain relativism in religious matters.”[9]

Stroumsa and others who fall into this error believe that Tertullian’s position on religious freedom can only be considered genuine and to have integrity if it sits within a broader philosophy of “relativism in religious matters.” However, Tertullian’s arguments, while uncompromising, reflect Christian orthodoxy. Tertullian’s repudiation of non-Christian beliefs and practices cannot be presented as equivalent to the intolerance of the Roman state which criminalised Christians, and subjected them to all manner of horrific persecutions, tortures, and executions. Tertullian does not call for the same treatment to be visited upon those who worship pagan gods. Stroumsa’s suggestion, that there is “a fundamental ambivalence, a double tradition within early Christian psyche: a demand for tolerance together with an acceptance of intolerance, its presuppositions and its consequences”, does not survive even modest scrutiny. If we are to follow his logic we might assume he is saying that Christians should not expect freedom and equality, or even protection from violent persecution, unless they are willing to adopt universalist beliefs. In other words, the only way for Christians to contend for religious freedom with any integrity would be to cease to be Christians in any faithful, historically orthodox sense.

It remains one of the markers of the majority of those toiling in this cause, that we can hold to the exclusive truth claims of our respective faiths, including those that are critical of the beliefs and practices of others, whilst committed to the freedom and dignity of all people to determine for themselves their religious convictions and live in accordance with their consciences. There is no contradiction in these positions. It might be perceived as a variation on Voltaire’s Maxim, “I may not agree with what you have to say but I will defend to the death your right to say it.” Put another way, Christians need not affirm their fellow citizens have a right to be wrong on theological matters. But, on account of their insistence on human dignity, given by God equally to all, and the principle that the Gospel can only truly be proclaimed and received in freedom, Christians can and must affirm that their fellow citizens ought to be immune from violence, coercion, or invidious discrimination when they are wrong on religious matters. 

It is more common to see rational philosophical arguments presented for religious freedom for all, rather than perspectives drawn from Scripture. That shouldn’t be misunderstood as meaning that there aren’t Biblical reasons to support the concept, or that religious freedom for all contradicts the Bible as some Christians argue. For example, as I just alluded to above, those championing religious freedom often point to the inherent, God-given dignity of all human beings on account of their creation in His image (Genesis 1: 26-27). Being made in God’s image means we have agency: the ability to think, discern, and decide. Removing that right to consider and decide whether to worship God, even when that decision is to not worship the One True God, diminishes the dignity God has given each of us as image bearers.

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[1] Wilken, Liberty in the Things of God: The Christian Origins of Religious Freedom, 11.

[2] Wilken, Liberty in the Things of God: The Christian Origins of Religious Freedom, 16.

[3] Dale Chamberlain, John MacArthur Calls Religious Freedom ‘Nonsense’: ‘We Support the Truth’, 10 January 2022, https://churchleaders.com/news/414469-john-macarthur-calls-religious-freedom-nonsense-we-support-the-truth.html.

[4] Tertullian, The Apology, 47.

[5] Tertullian, The Address of Q. Sept. Tertullian to Scapula Tertullus, Proconsul of Africa.

[6] Tertullian, The Apology, 20–21.

[7] Jan Henrick Waszink et al., De Idololatria (Brill, 1987), 1:23.

[8] Stroumsa, ‘Tertullian on Idolatry and the Limits of Tolerance’, in Tolerance and Intolerance in Early Judaism and Christianity (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 173.

[9] Stroumsa, ‘Tertullian on Idolatry and the Limits of Tolerance’, 174.

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Miles Windsor serves as Director of Strategic Campaigns, International Strategies, at the Religious Freedom Institute. The article series is based on a paper that Windsor submitted for his Masters of Religion (MRel) programme in Middle East and North Africa Studies, with the Arab Baptist Theological Seminary (ABTS Lebanon) in Beirut entitled “Analysis of and Applications from the Writings of Tertullian about Persecution for Today.” The original paper focused on the writings of Quintus Septimus Florens Tertullianus (Tertullian of Carthage), identifying parallels between historic and contemporary persecution experiences and responses, with analysis.